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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to determine individuals’ willingness to enroll in voluntary 
payments for carbon sequestration programs through the use of a discrete choice experiment 
delivered to forest owners living in the rapidly urbanizing region surrounding Charlotte, North 
Carolina. We examined forest owners’ willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration 
policies under different levels of financial incentives (annual revenue), different contract lengths 
and different program administrators (e.g., private companies versus a state or federal agency). We 
also examined the influence forest owners’ sense of place had on their willingness to enroll in 
hypothetical programs. Our results showed a high level of ambivalence towards participating in 
payments for carbon sequestration programs. However, both financial incentives and contract 
lengths significantly influenced forest owners’ intent to enroll. Neither program administration nor 
forest owners’ sense of place influenced intent to enroll. While our analyses indicated payments 
from carbon sequestration programs are not currently competitive with the monetary returns 
expected from timber harvest or property sales, certain forest owners might see payments for 
carbon sequestration programs as a viable option for offsetting increasing tax costs as development 
encroaches and property values rise. 
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Payments for Carbon Sequestration to Alleviate Development Pressure 1 
in a Rapidly Urbanizing Region 2 
 3 
Introduction 4 
Across the United States, forest and agricultural landscapes are becoming increasingly 5 
fragmented as urban populations grow and cities expand (Theobald 2005; Theobald 2001; 6 
Theobald and Romme 2007). The fragmentation of urban-proximate forest and agricultural 7 
landscapes can have both immediate and long-term effects on natural systems. Immediate 8 
impacts include the displacement of wildlife as habitat degrades as well as reductions in water 9 
quality as erosion increases due to the direct removal of above-ground biomass (Hansen et al. 10 
2005; Paul and Meyer 2001). The long-term environmental impacts of urban-proximate 11 
landscape fragmentation are more difficult to observe. The loss of endemic plant and animal 12 
species as well as biological diversity more generally, may only be realized after urbanization is 13 
well underway (Theobald, Miller, and Hobbs 1997). Similarly, alterations to natural or semi-14 
natural hydrologic systems (primarily as a result of increased water use) may impact the ability 15 
of ecological systems to respond to drought and climate-related stressors (Allan 2004). In 16 
response to these direct impacts and long-term feedbacks, urban planners, forest managers and 17 
agricultural associations are actively seeking out and exploring viable policies and programs that 18 
conserve forest and agricultural landscapes and maintain the ecosystem services they provide 19 
(Gobster, Stewart, and Bengston 2004). 20 
Payments for ecosystem services policies are one of many potential policy options to 21 
slow the rate of land use conversion in urbanizing areas (Bengston, Fletcher, and Nelson 2004; 22 
Salzman 2005). Payments for ecosystem services can provide non-industrial private forest 23 
owners a financial incentive to conserve or manage their land for the production of a valued 24 
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ecosystem service like sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, maintaining water quality or 25 
conserving wildlife habitat (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008; Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008). 26 
Simply put, payments for ecosystem services programs are policy instruments which require 27 
individuals (typically landowners) to engage in a specific land management practice that: 1) 28 
comes at a personal cost (which can include opportunity costs); and 2) results in the continued or 29 
enhanced production of an ecological service that benefits society (Shelley 2011). As a note, we 30 
use the terminology ‘payments for ecosystem services’ given it connotes the Millennium 31 
Ecosystem Assessment’s simple definition of ‘ecosystem services’ as “the benefits people obtain 32 
from ecosystems” (2003, 3). Interested readers are referred to Shelley (2011) and Derissen and 33 
Latacz-Lohmann (2013) for substantive reviews of the terminology used to describe these types 34 
of policy instruments. 35 
Payments for carbon sequestration policies are particularly attractive mechanisms 36 
because they often do not require intensive investments of either time or money from the forest 37 
owner, allowing the forest owner to benefit financially from non-intensive management 38 
strategies (Bigsby 2009; Lippke and Perez-Garcia 2008). Payments for carbon sequestration 39 
policies may be especially appealing in the United States where most non-industrial private 40 
forest owners do not actively manage their property through a forest management plan. Just 4% 41 
of non-industrial private forest owners in the United States have a written management plan and 42 
only 14% have ever sought out professional advice about their woodlands (Butler 2008). Other 43 
potential policy solutions such as cost-share programs have not been widely adopted, presumably 44 
because they are designed to supplement the forest products industry and often stipulate forest 45 
owners actively manage their woodlands for timber extraction (Kilgore et al. 2007); only 6% of 46 
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non-industrial private forest owners in the United States have ever participated in a cost-share 47 
program (Butler 2008). 48 
Aside from the appeal of not being directly tied to the forest products industry, payments 49 
for carbon sequestration policies might also be attractive to forest owners because they align 50 
directly with non-timber values (Bengston, Asah, and Butler 2010). Over the past 45 years, the 51 
nonuse and noneconomic values private forest owners’ ascribe to their woodlands have become 52 
stronger (Bengston, Asah, and Butler 2010). Urban residents in particular, tend to hold the 53 
strongest nonuse forest values (Tarrant, Cordell, and Green 2003). Additionally, the average age 54 
of the non-industrial private forest owner in the United States is declining as older forest owners 55 
either sell their properties for development or transfer them to their children (Butler 2008). The 56 
growing body of research on the shifting values of non-industrial private forest owners suggests 57 
younger generations who inherit land have very strong psychological attachments to their 58 
properties (Bliss and Martin 1989; Creighton, Blatner, and Carroll 2015; Gordon, Barton, and 59 
Adams 2013; BenDor et al. 2014). The strong meanings forest owners tie to their properties is 60 
likely an important factor affecting decisions about how they manage their land. Logically, the 61 
stronger the psychological meanings a forest owner has towards their woodlands, the less likely 62 
they would be to sell; conversely, the more likely they would be to enroll in a program allowing 63 
them to manage their land in a low-intensity yet financially-beneficial way. 64 
Aim and Objectives 65 
Despite the anticipated benefits associated with payments for carbon sequestration 66 
policies, only a few studies have explicitly examined the willingness of forest owners in 67 
urbanizing regions to enroll in voluntary payments for carbon sequestration programs (Fletcher, 68 
Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011). Recent 69 
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related research has been conducted on forest owners’ attitudes towards carbon sequestration 70 
programs (Khanal et al. 2016). In this study we explored individuals’ willingness to enroll in a 71 
voluntary payments for carbon sequestration program through the use of a discrete choice 72 
experiment delivered to non-industrial private forest owners living in the rapidly urbanizing 73 
region surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina (USA). Specifically, we examined forest owners’ 74 
willingness to adopt payments for carbon sequestration policies that varied in their financial 75 
incentives (i.e., annual payments), contract length requirements and type of administration (e.g., 76 
private companies versus a state or federal agency). Given payments for carbon sequestration 77 
programs may be more appealing to individuals who ascribe strong personal meanings to their 78 
forestland, we also examined the influence forest owners’ ‘sense of place’ has on their 79 
willingness to enroll in a program. Our analysis was guided by four distinct hypotheses, each of 80 
which is grounded in the literature, these are: 81 
H1: Financial incentives will positively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments 82 
for carbon sequestration programs. 83 
H2: Contract length will negatively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for 84 
carbon sequestration programs. 85 
H3: The type of organization (federal agency, state agency or a private company) 86 
administering a payments for carbon sequestration program, will not influence 87 
individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. 88 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between individuals’ sense of place toward their 89 
forested land and their intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration 90 
programs. 91 
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In addition to explicitly testing these hypotheses, we used data collected from site visits 92 
to respondents’ properties to estimate those properties’ development and timber value; these 93 
values were compared against the financial returns that would be realized if the forest owner 94 
were to enroll in the hypothetical programs described in the discrete choice experiment. Our 95 
intent is to see how a hypothetical carbon market compares to current timber and development 96 
markets that are driving land use conversion throughout the region. 97 
Literature Review 98 
Forest Owners’ Intent to Enroll in Payments for Carbon Sequestration Programs  99 
There is a growing body of research that has examined the willingness of private forest 100 
owners to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs using discrete choice 101 
methods. Previous research has predominantly focused on the northern Atlantic and Midwestern 102 
states (Table 1), we were unable to identify any research on the preferences for carbon 103 
sequestration program attributes in the Southeastern United States. 104 
Existing research focused on the willingness of private forest owners to participate in 105 
carbon sequestration programs has assessed the relative influence of different program attributes 106 
on willingness to participate. Fletcher et al. (2009) assessed the willingness of seventeen 107 
Massachusetts private forest owners to sequester carbon on their forestland based on six 108 
hypothetical programs. In their study, program attributes such as expected payment per acre ($5, 109 
$15 or $30), length of contract (5 or 10 years), penalty for early withdrawal and the requirement 110 
to have a forest management plan in place were evaluated. The results suggested contract length, 111 
expected payment per acre and early withdrawal penalties were significant determinants of 112 
program participation. Similar results were identified in a related study by Dickinson et al. 113 
(2012) which estimated participation of Massachusetts private forest owners across three 114 
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hypothetical carbon sequestration programs. The program attributes examined included: contract 115 
length (5, 10 or 15 years), financial incentives ($5, $15 or $30 per acre annual revenue), the 116 
requirement for a forest management plan to be in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early 117 
withdrawal from the program. The results indicated per acre annual revenue was a positive 118 
predictor of program enrollment, while contract length, the requirement to have a forest 119 
management plan in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early withdrawal were all 120 
negatively related to forest owners’ intent to enroll. In another study investigating the intentions 121 
of Massachusetts forest owners to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs, 122 
Markowski-Lindsay et al. (2011) found shorter contracts (15 years), higher payments ($1000 per 123 
acre per year), the ability to withdraw from the program without penalty and not being required 124 
to have a forest management plan in place were positive predictors of program enrollment. The 125 
authors note that financial incentives (annual revenue per acre) were very inelastic (i.e., the 126 
intent to enroll did not change much as the incentive price increased or decreased, Png 2012). 127 
The inelasticity of financial incentives suggests forest owners’ participation is likely dependent 128 
upon other factors. Markowski-Lindsay et al.’s (2011) study determined the overall probability 129 
of enrollment in payments for carbon sequestration programs for Massachusetts forest owners 130 
was less than 38%, even when desirable attributes were maximized and undesirable attributes 131 
were minimized. 132 
Other studies have examined the influence of program attributes associated with 133 
payments for other ecosystem services, aside from carbon sequestration (Rabotyagov and Lin 134 
2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015). Knoot et 135 
al. (2015) investigated the effect of four cumulative requirement levels (i.e., no requirements, 136 
management plan, practices and inspection) and their impact on Wisconsin forest owners’ 137 
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willingness to participate in programs that offered payments for the provisioning of three 138 
ecosystem services: bird habitat, carbon sequestration and water quality. Their results revealed 139 
requirements involving more commitment deterred participation; participation rates dropped 140 
from 42% when no requirements were stipulated to 18% when all of the aforementioned land 141 
management practices were required. Knoot et al. (2015) also found that program administration 142 
(government or market) held no significant influence on participation across all requirement 143 
levels. This is inconsistent with findings from stakeholder focus groups in the Charlotte 144 
metropolitan region, which indicated strong anti-government sentiment that could affect forest 145 
owners’ receptivity to government administered programs in our study area (BenDor et al. 2014). 146 
Similarly, Kelly et al. (2015) assessed the likelihood of New York forest owners to enroll in 147 
various payments for forest conservation programs. The payments for conservation programs 148 
received an average enrollment of 8% regardless of time commitment. However, financial 149 
incentives (annual payment levels) and management plan requirements were significant 150 
attributes affecting enrollment. In another similar study, Rabotyagov and Lin (2013) explored the 151 
preferences for attributes of working forest conservation contracts among Washington forest 152 
owners. Of the three program attributes investigated, contract length significantly influenced the 153 
likelihood of program participation. Finally, through focus groups with Forest Guild members, 154 
Wade and Moseley (2011) found profitability to be the greatest barrier to private forest owners’ 155 
enrollment in voluntary payments for carbon sequestration programs. Financial incentives 156 
positively affecting enrollment rates is a consistent finding across the literature. 157 
Psychological and Sociodemographic Factors Influencing Program Enrollment 158 
Aside from the attributes associated with payments for carbon sequestration programs, 159 
forest owners’ psychological attachments to their property might affect their intent to enroll 160 
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(Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011). However, no previous study has explicitly and empirically 161 
examined this relationship. ‘Sense of place’ is a positive bond between individuals and their 162 
environment, based on affect, cognition and symbolic meanings (Stedman 2002). Several studies 163 
suggest the sense of place that an individual forest owner has towards their property will affect 164 
how they manage that property (Lai and Kreuter 2012; Lokocz, Ryan, and Sadler 2011).  165 
         Lai and Kreuter (2012) examined how ‘place attachment’ (a construct very similar to 166 
sense of place) influenced Texas landowners’ intent to retain their land and engage in 167 
conservation behaviors. Much like the forest owners near Charlotte in our study, the landowners 168 
examined in Lai and Kreuter’s study were facing development pressure from the nearby cities of 169 
Austin and San Antonio. Landowners living in the Hill Country region adjacent to the 170 
metropolitan areas surrounding both of these cities indicated a strong intent to keep their 171 
property in the family. Land owners’ attachments to their personal properties, as well as their 172 
perceptions of environmental change throughout the region, were significantly and positively 173 
related to the intent to retain their properties. In addition, landowners who indicated they were 174 
either heavily dependent upon, or attached a lot of social meanings to, their properties were 175 
willing to invest more in conservation-oriented land management strategies. 176 
         Relatedly, Lokocz et al. (2011) utilized photo-elicitation methods to examine how rural 177 
Massachusetts residents’ psychological attachments to local landscape features influenced their 178 
attitudes toward conservation and land use planning. Participants in the study indicated a high 179 
level of attachment towards natural areas (consisting of forests, streams, ponds and meadows) 180 
and the majority of participants showed strong support for protecting local woodlands and 181 
natural resources. The study’s qualitative methods illustrate how the strong, personally 182 
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meaningful connections an individual has towards local and familiar landscapes can shape 183 
support for conservation-oriented land use planning efforts.   184 
         In addition to sense of place and place attachment, Thompson and Hansen (2013; 2012) 185 
identified other psychological, cultural and social factors likely to influence individuals’ 186 
willingness to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs. These factors included 187 
landowners’ values, their ecological knowledge, the risk they associate with encroaching 188 
development, as well as their willingness to communicate and learn about payments for carbon 189 
sequestration programs. 190 
Methods 191 
Study Region 192 
This study focused on the area surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina (USA) (Figure 1). 193 
Since the 1980s the city and its surrounding metropolitan region have experienced rapid 194 
population growth characterized by disjunct, low-density development (Meentemeyer et al. 195 
2013). Urban development throughout the region has come at the expense of forest and 196 
agricultural lands, and growth projections for the region suggest more than 210,000 ha of 197 
forested and agricultural land will be converted to development by the year 2030 if observed 198 
trends between 1996 and 2006 continue (Meentemeyer et al. 2013). The majority of forested land 199 
throughout the region is owned by non-industrial private forest owners, and these holdings tend 200 
to be relatively small (< 10 ha), which limits forest owners’ ability to financially benefit from 201 
either harvesting timber or biomass (Dorning, Smith, et al. 2015). Past research in the region 202 
suggests forest owners are concerned with rising property taxes and the lack of tax-relief policies 203 
focused on conserving forested lands; this concern is compounded by strong emotional and 204 
psychological ties to the region’s culturally rich landscapes (BenDor et al. 2014). Currently, 205 
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there are no established policies that provide non-industrial private forest owners with an 206 
opportunity to benefit financially from conserving or managing their woodlands (North Carolina 207 
Department of Revenue 2015). The region does have a present-use value program that allows 208 
land to be valued based upon its use for forestry or agriculture, which is substantially less than its 209 
development value. However, not all forested land throughout the region qualifies for the 210 
present-use value program. The program requires forest owners to own at least 20 acres (8.09 211 
hectares) and have a forest management plan in place that allows timber harvesting. These 212 
requirements limit the ability of the present-use value program to be an indirect tool capable of 213 
slowing urban growth. Given this, other more direct land use policies need to be explored. It is 214 
possible a regional carbon sequestration market could allow forest owners the ability to benefit 215 
financially from conserving or managing their woodlands while maintaining their strong 216 
emotional and psychological connections to their properties. 217 
Discrete Choice Experimental Design 218 
We developed a discrete choice experiment to explore contingent forest owner behaviors 219 
in response to hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs. Stated choice methods 220 
are commonly used to understand individuals’ behavioral responses to hypothetical choices 221 
(Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). Our goal was to understand which factors exhibit the most 222 
influence on forest owners’ behavioral intentions, including the attributes of the payment 223 
program as well as individual psychological and sociodemographic factors. Our analysis was 224 
guided by a desire to better understand if, and how, the attributes of the payment program alterd 225 
forest owners’ preferences for those programs. Our intent was not to estimate a willingness to 226 
accept value for all of the non-financial attributes of payments programs, rather we were 227 
primarily interested in taking advantage of the methodological benefits of discrete choice 228 
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experiments (i.e., requiring respondents to cognitively evaluates specific trade-offs among 229 
program attributes (Hanley, Mourato, and Wright 2001)) to develop a better understanding of the 230 
program attributes forest owners considered important when contemplating enrolling in a 231 
payments for carbon sequestration program.  232 
Econometric Model of Contingent Behavior. In trying to understand the likelihood that 233 
private forest owners would enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, we were 234 
specifically interested in whether or not financial incentives, contract lengths and program 235 
administration influences individuals’ contingent behaviors. These three factors were combined 236 
and varied across meaningful ranges to create a suite of hypothetical, yet realistic, payments for 237 
carbon sequestration programs. For each program, forest owners were asked to carefully consider 238 
the combination of attributes being presented and make a “yes/no” choice as to whether or not 239 
they would participate in the program. A “yes” response indicates forest owners derive more 240 
utility from participating in the program than they would otherwise. Utility formulation for each 241 
binary discrete choice made in response to a hypothetical program follows the random utility 242 
framework (McFadden 1973). Across an entire set of choices, j, and a sample of individuals, i, 243 
the linear equation used to estimate random and explainable (systematic) utility is expressed as 244 
 245 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. 246 
 247 
The explainable (systematic) utilities 𝑉𝑖𝑗 are a function of the design matrix 𝑋, which represents 248 
attributes presented in various combinations across the choice set. The 𝛽′ coefficients are 249 
estimated for each attribute.  250 
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Scenario Development, Attributes and Levels. To elicit the most valid responses, the 251 
survey instrument included a narrative frame describing the general characteristics of payments 252 
for carbon sequestration programs and how they could be implemented in the study region. 253 
Following the narrative framing statement, forest owners were asked to evaluate a set of nine 254 
possible payments for carbon sequestration programs and, for each program, to carefully 255 
consider its attributes and indicate whether or not they would participate in the program. 256 
Respondents were also given an opt out response option to avoid the likelihood of a forest owner 257 
providing a response if they felt uninformed or unqualified to make a decision (Banzhaf, 258 
Johnson, and Mathews 2001; Kontoleon and Yabe 2003). The choice set was comprised of 259 
various combinations of the three key attributes: financial incentives, contract lengths and 260 
program administration. Each of these three attributes were varied across three levels; the levels 261 
were set to encompass realistic ranges based upon previous research and consultation with 262 
experts in the region’s potential for a carbon sequestration market. The full narrative frame and 263 
choice set are shown in Figure 2; individual attributes and their specified levels are noted in 264 
Table 1. The narrative was developed such that it clearly described the essential components of a 265 
payments for ecosystem services program, as outlined by Engel et al. (2008). These essential 266 
components are: 1) an explicit description of the type of land being conserved and the ecosystem 267 
service it provides; 2) the ability of enrollees in the program to terminate the contractual 268 
relationship; and 3) the establishment of a monitoring system (in our case a written forest 269 
management plan that required conservation) in order to ensure payments are the result of 270 
additional land management activities. Given payments for ecosystem services programs often 271 
fail to demonstrate additionality, producing more of a given ecosystem service than would have 272 
been produced without the program, we attempted to make it as clear and as explicit as possible 273 
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that the payments would not be “money for nothing” (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Ferraro 274 
and Pattanayak 2006). 275 
With three attributes, each presented at one of three levels in any given program, there 276 
were a total of 27 possible combinations to represent different carbon sequestration programs. 277 
Given it was deemed too burdensome to have each forest owner consider and respond to all 27 278 
combinations, we opted for a fractional factorial design comprised of nine combinations (i.e., 279 
hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs). All sampled forest owners received 280 
the same choice set of nine possible carbon sequestration programs. 281 
Variables Used in Econometric Model 282 
 A summary of all variables used in the econometric modeling is provided in Table 2. 283 
Respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics were captured through the first mail-back survey. 284 
Specifically, we collected data on forest owners’ age, gender, education and income. We also 285 
collected data on the amount of time the forest owner has spent on the property (presence); this 286 
was calculated as the total years of ownership multiplied by the number of days they spend on 287 
the property per year. The first mail-back survey also ascertained whether or not respondents had 288 
a forest management plan in place (management plan present) and whether they currently 289 
harvested timber for income on their property (harvest for income). 290 
The first mail-back survey was also used to measure forest owners’ psychological 291 
connections to forested areas on their properties. We used Jorgensen and Stedman’s (2006) 292 
psychometric scale, modifying each statement so that it referred explicitly to respondents’ 293 
forested property. Data obtained via the 5-point Likert scale were analyzed for reliability 294 
(Cronbach’s  greater than 0.70 were deemed acceptable following Nunnally and Bernstein 295 
1994), adequate factor loadings (loadings greater than 0.60 were deemed acceptable following 296 
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Hair et al. 2009) and their fit to a hypothesized single-factor measurement model (relative 2 297 
values less than 3.0 were deemed acceptable following Carmines and McIver 1981). With these 298 
criteria satisfied, a single sense of place factor score was calculated for inclusion in the mixed 299 
effects logistic regression model described below. This method is identical to that used in 300 
previous analyses of these data (Dorning, Smith, et al., 2015). 301 
Other variables included in the model were derived from either the analysis of satellite 302 
imagery/LiDAR data or publically available property tax records. Specific measures included the 303 
size of the forest stand on the respondent’s property estimated via satellite imagery (forest size) 304 
and the appraised value of the parcel extracted from 2011 tax records (economic value). Very 305 
few stated choice experiments have used biophysical variables derived via remote sensing as 306 
factors influencing forest owners’ decisions; exceptions include the work of Naidoo and 307 
Adamowicz (2005) and Dorning and her colleagues (2015). 308 
Econometric Model Specification 309 
We used a mixed effects logistic regression specification to estimate the probability that 310 
forest owners would participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs depending upon 311 
the level of attributes presented. The mixed effects logistic regression is a flexible specification 312 
that can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train 2000). The mixed effects 313 
logistic regression specification decomposes random error into two components; the first 314 
component is correlated over alternatives and heteroskedastic while the second part is assumed 315 
to be independently and identically distributed over alternatives and individuals (McFadden 316 
1984). This is noteworthy because individuals’ responses within the choice set are likely to be 317 
highly correlated. Preferences and subsequently utility functions will vary between individuals; 318 
the mixed effects specification accommodates this and is commonly used to overcome the 319 
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limitations of standard logit and conditional logit specifications (McFadden and Train 2000). Our 320 
model is specified as: 321 
 322 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝜇 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 +323 
𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 +324 
𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +325 
𝛽12𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. 326 
 327 
The model posits the probability of enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration programs is a 328 
function of the program’s attributes, an individual’s sociodemographic characteristics and the 329 
characteristics of their property. Estimation was completed using dummy variable coding for 330 
attribute levels and the meqrlogit command in Stata 14.0 (StataCorp 2015). 331 
Data Collection 332 
 Data on forest owners and their contingent enrollment in hypothetical payments for 333 
carbon sequestration programs were collected via two self-administered mail-back surveys. We 334 
sent surveys to a sample of forest owners in a five-county region on the eastern side of Charlotte, 335 
an extent characterizing the region’s full development gradient. We drew a sample of 2,500 336 
landowners from a sampling frame comprised of private forest owners within the five-county 337 
study area; forest owner names and addresses were obtained from publically available tax 338 
records. The sample consisted of forest owners who owned more than 2 ha of contiguous forest 339 
(determined via analysis of both 2011 Landsat and LiDAR data (Singh et al. 2012)). The initial 340 
sample of forest owners were asked to agree to an on-site ecological assessment and timber 341 
cruise of their property and, subsequently, to complete two mail-back surveys; a total of 143 342 
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(5.7%) forest owners agreed. The first mail-back survey was administered from November 2011 343 
to April 2012; it asked about forest owners’ sociodemographic characteristics, how they 344 
managed woodlands on their property as well as their psychological attachment to their property. 345 
A total of 126 out of the 143 woodland owners (88%) completed this first mail-back survey. The 346 
second mail-back survey was administered in November 2013 to the 126 forest owners who 347 
responded to the first survey. The second mail-back survey was substantially shorter than the 348 
first, containing only a series of stated preference questions related to the forest owners’ 349 
willingness to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs. A total of 65 forest 350 
owners, out of the 126 who received the second mail-back survey, completed and returned the 351 
instrument. This tabulates out to a 49.6% response rate, which is high relative to most mail 352 
surveys administered to either the general public or forest owners (Dillman, Smyth, and 353 
Christian 2008). Five respondents indicated their property had been sold since they responded to 354 
the first mail-back survey two years earlier. All results presented in this study are for the 355 
remaining 60 forest owners and their properties. 356 
 Both survey packets mailed to respondents included a personalized map with an aerial 357 
photo of forested land on the respondents’ property. In a cover letter, we asked forest owners to 358 
respond to the questions in reference to the forested land shown on the map, excluding from 359 
consideration other forested areas they might have owned. These explicit instructions were 360 
included to make responses and contingent decisions personally meaningful. 361 
Results 362 
The characteristics of our sample of forest owners and their properties are reported in 363 
Table 2. The majority of respondents (71.7%) were men and the mean age was 64.2 (SD = 11.2).  364 
All respondents had graduated from high school, with the majority (68.3%) also having a 365 
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bachelor’s degree. Respondents’ properties ranged in size from one to fifty-one hectares, with an 366 
average size of 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4). On average, respondents indicated owning their 367 
forestland for at least twenty years (M = 20.4, SD = 12.8); this varied widely however, with 368 
length of ownership ranging from two to fifty-eight years. The majority of respondents (68.3%) 369 
lived on or within a half-mile of the forested property.  370 
The average size of respondents’ forests was 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4) and the assessed tax 371 
value of their entire property was just under $400 thousand USD.  However, both the size of 372 
respondents’ forest stands and the value of their properties varied widely (Table 2), mitigating 373 
some of the concern over coverage error given the relatively small sample. Only a relatively 374 
small proportion (18.3%) of our sample reported harvesting timber to generate income and just 375 
under one-third (31.7%) reported having a management plan in place. 376 
When queried about the sense of place respondents had towards their forested property, 377 
respondents on average reported strong personal meanings (Table 3). For example, 77.2% of 378 
sampled forest owners indicated moderate or complete agreement with the statement “I feel 379 
relaxed when I’m on my wooded land.” Similarly, 62.5% of the sample indicated moderate or 380 
complete agreement with the statement “I feel happiest when I’m on my wooded land.” 381 
 The results from the hierarchical mixed effects logistic regression model, which predicted 382 
forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, are shown in 383 
Table 4. The model’s estimates can be interpreted as the welfare of each attribute’s level. For the 384 
non-price attributes (contract length and program administration) and the price attribute (per acre 385 
annual payment), increases (decreases) in welfare are indicated by positive (negative) values. 386 
The results revealed annual payment levels do significantly influence individuals’ 387 
likelihood of enrolling. The odds of a forest owner enrolling in a payments for carbon 388 
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sequestration program were 18.5 times higher if that program yielded $25 per acre annual 389 
payments as opposed to $5 per acre annual payments (Coef. = 2.917, p < 0.001). More notably, 390 
the odds of a forest owner enrolling in a payments for carbon sequestration program were nearly 391 
110 times greater if the program resulted in $50 per acre annual payments instead of $5 per acre 392 
annual payments (Coef. = 4.702, p < 0.001). These results supported our proposed hypothesis 393 
(H1) that financial incentives would positively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments 394 
for carbon sequestration programs. 395 
The results also revealed contract length significantly influences individuals’ likelihood 396 
of enrolling, with respondents preferring shorter contracts (15-year contract, Coef. = -2.266, p < 397 
0.001; 30-year contract, Coef. = -4.855, p < 0.001). While contract length was significant, its 398 
influence was marginal relative to the effect of annual payment levels, which exhibited a very 399 
strong signal. This result supported our proposed hypothesis (H2) that contract length would 400 
negatively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. 401 
The final attribute of the hypothetical programs, the type of agency administering the 402 
program, was not significantly related to individuals’ intent to enroll (Administered by a state 403 
agency: Coef. = 0.451, p = 0.266; Administered by a federal agency: Coef. = 0.613, p = 0.291). 404 
This result followed our proposed hypothesis (H3) that the type of organization administering a 405 
payments for carbon sequestration program would not influence individuals’ intent to enroll. 406 
The results also suggested forest owners’ education level and income influenced their 407 
intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. Forest owners who had obtained 408 
a higher level of formal education were significantly more likely to enroll in a program, 409 
regardless of program characteristics (Coef. = 0.597, p < 0.045). Additionally, wealthier 410 
individuals were significantly less likely to enroll in a program, regardless of program 411 
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characteristics (Coef.  = -0.286, p < 0.082). None of the other characteristics describing forest 412 
owners (age, gender, presence on the property or sense of place) were significantly related to 413 
their intent to enroll in a program. The finding of no significant relationship between forest 414 
owners’ sense of place towards their forested property and their willingness to enroll that 415 
property in a payments for carbon sequestration program was dissimilar to our proposed 416 
hypothesis of a positive relationship (H4). 417 
None of the characteristics of forest owners’ property (size of forest stand, the presence 418 
of a management plan, whether or not timber was harvested for income generation or economic 419 
(property) value) were significant predictors of the forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for 420 
carbon sequestration programs. 421 
We began this investigation by posing the question “Can a payments for carbon 422 
sequestration program alleviate development pressure in a rapidly urbanizing region?” We 423 
formally addressed this question by calculating the annual revenue generated by each of the 424 
hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs for each forest owner. For each forest 425 
owner i and each discrete choice opportunity c, this is 426 
 427 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑐 =   𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑐  ×  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐. 428 
 429 
The average initial annual revenue required to elicit an intent to enroll response varied widely, 430 
from $51 per acre for policies guaranteeing a $5 per acre annual payment, to $753 per acre for 431 
policies guaranteeing a $50 annual payment. After calculating all of the initial annual revenues 432 
for the choice opportunities in which a forest owner indicated an intent to enroll, we applied an 433 
annual discount rate of 4% across the hypothetical contracts’ lengths to account for the time 434 
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value of cash according to Folmer et al. (1995). This allowed us to arrive at a total discounted 435 
contract length revenue value. Our calculation was based on the assumption annual revenue 436 
would be received beginning in the second year of enrollment. The variation in intent to enroll 437 
prices was even more evident when viewed over the life of the contract; average discounted 438 
contract length revenue ranged from $190 per acre for the $5 per acre policies to $8,540 for the 439 
$50 per acre policies. 440 
We estimated the years of enrollment that would be required for respondents to receive 441 
equal returns from a payments for carbon sequestration program relative to returns they would 442 
receive from either cutting all of their forest for timber or selling it at its current (2014) market 443 
value; the results are shown in Table 5. If a payments for carbon sequestration program were 444 
available that yielded the maximum $50 per acre annual return over a 15-year contract length, 445 
forest owners would not be able to generate an equivalent amount of revenue from the program, 446 
even if they enrolled for two consecutive contracts (years of enrollment to match timber value = 447 
38.4). This result suggests that even under the highest-return option and a relatively long 448 
contract-length program, a payments for carbon sequestration program would not be an attractive 449 
alternative to either selling property for development or harvesting for timber. As can be seen in 450 
column 6 of Table 5 the years of enrollment required to equal their properties’ current market 451 
value is well beyond any planning time frame (i.e., 600 to > 13,000 years). Obviously there are a 452 
variety of factors that affect forest owners’ decisions to sell their property for development or 453 
harvest it for timber production; the purpose here is to compare the options purely on their 454 
financial returns. 455 
Discussion 456 
Policy Implications 457 
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As exurban development spreads across landscapes, large contiguous tracts of forest have 458 
become increasingly fragmented, threatening the ecosystem services they provide (Theobald 459 
2005; Theobald 2001; Theobald and Romme 2007). Payments for ecosystem service programs, 460 
and payments for carbon sequestration in particular, provide a mechanism through which 461 
regional planners and policy makers can conserve urban-proximate forestlands and the 462 
ecosystem services they provide by allowing private forest owners to benefit financially from not 463 
selling their land for development or harvesting for timber production (Bigsby 2009). Alternative 464 
policy mechanisms, such as the procurement and conservation of private forestland by a public 465 
or not-for-profit organization, can also alleviate development pressure (Newburn et al. 2005). 466 
However, transferring land from the private to public domain is only likely to occur near highly 467 
valued resources such as riparian areas, simply pushing development pressures to other areas 468 
around a metropolitan region (Dorning, Koch, et al. 2015). Additionally, the efficient transfer of 469 
private land to the public-domain requires complex payment and/or transfer options capable of 470 
meeting the needs of different types of private landowners (e.g., rural residents, farmers, forest 471 
owners) (Nielsen-Pincus, Ribe, and Johnson 2015). Payments for carbon sequestration programs 472 
offer a flexible policy alternative, allowing forest owners the ability to continue living on their 473 
properties while simultaneously receiving an annual payment for the carbon being sequestered 474 
and stored in their forest stands. 475 
While payments for carbon sequestration programs are attractive policy mechanisms at a 476 
conceptual level, their implementation has been severely limited by the lack of regional carbon 477 
markets (Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 2013). In the United States, the voluntary Chicago Climate 478 
Exchange (CCX) served as the primary outlet for such programs while in operation from 2003 to 479 
2011. Currently, there are only two active regional markets, California and the Regional 480 
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern portion of the country (Center for Climate 481 
and Energy Solutions 2016). These markets establish the price per ton of carbon sequestered 482 
based upon industries’ need to offset emissions and private forest owners’ willingness to manage 483 
their forests for carbon sequestration. In this research, we leveraged the ability of discrete choice 484 
experiments to determine if a payments for carbon sequestration program could succeed in the 485 
southeastern United States, where exurban forest owners are highly attached to their private 486 
lands and consequently may be more willing to opt into payments for carbon sequestration 487 
programs at a discounted rate, if it means their forest will remain intact. 488 
On many points, our results echoed the findings of previous research. Our sample of 489 
forest owners expressed a relatively limited interest in enrolling in payments for carbon 490 
sequestration programs. Even when presented with a very large annual payment of $50 per acre, 491 
only 45.8% of respondents indicated an intent to enroll; this proportion declined as annual 492 
payments were reduced and contract lengths were extended. This result is consistent with 493 
previous research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; 494 
Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014) and perhaps expected given most private 495 
forest owners in the United States are passive managers. We had expected a higher level of 496 
interest in payments for carbon sequestration programs given a recent region-wide study found 497 
non-industrial private forest owners to be generally receptive to payments for carbon 498 
sequestration programs (Khanal et al. 2016). Khanal and his colleagues found 30% of a sample 499 
of non-industrial forest owners from across the Southeastern US agreed with the statement 500 
“carbon sequestration could generate additional revenue for me”; only 11% of the sample 501 
disagreed with the statement. Similarly, 45% of the sample indicated they were “interested in 502 
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exploring carbon sequestration opportunities on [their] forestland”; only 12% were not 503 
interested. 504 
Our sample’s low level of interest in enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration 505 
programs is likely attributable to a variety of factors. First, they are likely to have a limited 506 
knowledge of the ‘ecosystem services’ concept and, relatedly, are likely to know very little about 507 
how carbon markets would actually work in practice (Metz and Weigel 2010). Given this, it is 508 
logical for forest owners to be hesitant about making, or even indicating their preferences for, 509 
decisions related to the long-term use of their property. More focused research, particularly 510 
research using multiple types of data (i.e., quantitative and qualitative), needs to be conducted to 511 
determine if a lack of knowledge and familiarity are in fact major barriers to forest owners’ 512 
intent to enroll in emerging carbon markets. Second, through the use of a stated choice 513 
experiment, our study required forest owners to carefully consider their forested property and 514 
what the consequences of each hypothetical policy scenario would be for themselves and their 515 
property. Previous research may have over-estimated forest owners’ interest in carbon 516 
sequestrations programs due to the fact simple statement items presented in mail-back 517 
questionnaires are context-deficient and do not require forest owners to carefully consider the 518 
details and consequences of their land-use decisions (Khanal et al. 2016). 519 
When our sample of forest owners did indicate an intent to enroll, their preferences were 520 
influenced by the financial returns yielded by the program as well as its length. Respondents had 521 
strong preferences for programs yielding higher returns, which is logical and consistent with all 522 
previous empirical research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; 523 
Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 524 
2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014). 525 
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The majority of previous research has also found non-industrial private forest owners tend to be 526 
hesitant to make long-term decisions committing them to managing their forestlands in any one 527 
particular way (Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 528 
2013; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014). This unfortunately does not bode 529 
well for the prospect of establishing a regional payments for carbon sequestration market within 530 
the study area. At the high point of the CCX (trading price of $7.50 per metric ton in 2008; 531 
Climate Policy Initiative 2016)), the maximum potential payments in the Southeast would have 532 
been around $15 per acre per year based on CCX’s estimated carbon sequestration rates across 533 
all Southeastern forest types. Current rates for the RGGI are even lower though their reports 534 
suggest prices are generally increasing over time, while trading prices in California are generally 535 
a bit higher (Climate Policy Initiative 2016). These markets have required contracts of a 536 
minimum of 15 years (CCX), with longer contracts (RGGI) sometimes required. Creation of a 537 
market in the Southeast would require a critical mass of tradable carbon, in this case, a large pool 538 
stored in private forests under long-term management contracts. For regional markets to be 539 
successful, industries that might see them as viable mechanisms to offset emissions would need 540 
some long-term assurances in the market’s stability. Absent that stability, alternative 541 
mechanisms or alternative carbon markets (e.g. REDD+) are likely to be preferred.   542 
We focused our survey on payments for carbon sequestration based on market prices for 543 
similar markets in the U.S., though other carbon payment mechanisms do exist. Payments for 544 
carbon storage, or avoided carbon release from deforestation, would likely provide much higher 545 
payment rates than those for sequestration as forest owners would be compensated for the total 546 
amount of carbon stored rather than incremental carbon sequestered. Additionally, estimates of 547 
the social cost of carbon at $36 per metric ton (Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of 548 
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Carbon 2013) far exceed the current value in most markets, bringing the potential payment level 549 
up to $72 per acre per year for carbon sequestered in Southeastern forests if the true cost of 550 
carbon were to be reflected in market prices (though Moore and Diaz (2015) argue the figure 551 
should be much higher). Given the preference of forest owners for greater financial returns, 552 
higher payment rates could increase the feasibility of carbon programs for alleviating 553 
development pressure in urbanizing areas.  554 
Despite the relative ambivalence of forest owners towards participating in payments for 555 
carbon sequestration programs at current rates and their aversion to programs with longer 556 
contract lengths, our results did identify some demographic groups that can be targeted as ‘early 557 
adopters’ to pilot payments for carbon sequestration programs. Specifically, our results 558 
suggested more educated individuals as well as individuals with smaller incomes were 559 
significantly more likely to indicate intent to enroll relative to forest owners with fewer years of 560 
formal education and wealthier individuals. These findings could be insightful for efficiently 561 
targeting specific types of forest owners most likely to participate in a pilot payments for carbon 562 
sequestration program, if one were initiated throughout the region. These findings can be used to 563 
develop communication strategies targeted at specific forest owners that are most likely to enroll. 564 
Given our findings suggest the populations most likely to enroll are those forest owners who are 565 
more educated and who also have smaller annual incomes, the logical ‘target population’ would 566 
be retirees looking to maintain the aesthetic appeal of their forested land while also having some 567 
formal policy mechanism that would allow them to generate a cash-flow from their passive 568 
ownership. 569 
It is interesting to note forest owners’ sense of place was not significantly related to their 570 
intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. This is especially noteworthy 571 
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given forest owners, on average, indicated strong personal meanings attached to their forested 572 
property. Previous research into payments for ecosystem services programs suggests that when 573 
the amount of the payment itself is marginal relative to landowners’ other sources of income (as 574 
is the case in our study area), the larger the influence of other benefits such as maintaining a 575 
desired aesthetic or family/cultural values tied to the land (Muradian et al. 2010). We can only 576 
speculate as to why sense of place was not significantly related to forest owners’ willingness to 577 
enroll, as anticipated. One possible explanation is that simply having the word ‘program’ 578 
attached may cause forest owners to wrongfully identify payments for carbon sequestration 579 
programs with other more intensive programs, such as present use valuation programs. Simply 580 
put, some forest owners may not associate payments for carbon sequestration programs with an 581 
increased ability to maintain the non-market values they ascribe to their forested property, 582 
marginalizing the true and expected relationship between the sense of place construct and 583 
willingness to enroll. Payment may actually be viewed as undermining the intrinsic values the 584 
forest owner wishes to protect (Muradian et al. 2013). 585 
Limitations 586 
 Estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical policies and 587 
programs via stated choice methods is a difficult task for economists and other social scientists 588 
who focus on human decision making. This difficulty comes from a variety of different sources 589 
ranging from deciding which attributes define the hypothetical policy or program to establishing 590 
a realistic range of values across which those attributes will vary in the choice set. Attributes and 591 
levels selected should be both understandable (DeShazo and Fermo 2002) and relevant (Hensher 592 
2006) to respondents. In this study, we attempted to meet both of these criteria through a detailed 593 
review of previous research on the feasibility and costs associated with payments for carbon 594 
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sequestration programs and consultation with several bioeconomists who were able to inform the 595 
levels we chose to use for our annual payments per acre attribute. While we hope this 596 
precautionary step increases the validity of our findings, there are undoubtedly a wide variety of 597 
program characteristics (e.g., method of payment, compliance requirements, etc.) that also likely 598 
to influence forest owners’ willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. 599 
We were only able to focus on a small set of attributes within this study, but hope future research 600 
will build upon our findings and the findings of similar work (Table 1). 601 
Another difficulty in estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical 602 
policies and programs via stated choice programs is the proper analytical treatment of collected 603 
data. Resource economists have gradually adapted more complex and sophisticated statistical 604 
specifications, moving from the simple binary logit model to the multinomial logit model to the 605 
conditional logit model and now the mixed effects logit model (Hensher and Greene 2002). With 606 
the addition of each additional specification comes a new set of assumptions that analysts must 607 
be wary of. Here, we used a mixed logit model with one random parameter, the individual, that 608 
we specified as being normally distributed. Our specification is not analytically novel, but it does 609 
mitigate all of the concerns raised by Hensher and Greene (2002). These concerns include: 610 
appropriate selection of parameters to be included as random parameters, appropriate selection of 611 
the distribution of the random parameters and appropriate specification of the way random 612 
parameters enter the model. We felt the mixed logit specification was appropriate given it relaxes 613 
independence of irrelevant alternatives property inherent in standard logit and conditional logit 614 
models and subsequently allows response variable to be correlated across the choice situations 615 
presented to each individual (Train 2009). Future work that chooses to used stated preference 616 
data to estimate forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, 617 
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and chooses to fit those data with mixed effects logit specifications should be mindful of the 618 
concerns detailed by Hensher and Greene (2002) 619 
Conclusion 620 
We began this investigation to determine forest owners’ willingness to enroll in a 621 
payments for carbon sequestration market in an urbanizing region. In our study area surrounding 622 
metropolitan Charlotte, the potential for market failure is high as urbanization is rapidly 623 
consuming the landscape (Meentemeyer et al. 2013; Terando et al. 2014). Even if private forest 624 
owners are committed to not developing their properties, they can benefit financially from stands 625 
on their property by harvesting them for timber production. Both development and harvesting for 626 
timber production are financially enticing, but dramatically alter the ecological function of the 627 
landscape. While the majority of forest owners in our study were reluctant to indicate an intent to 628 
enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, we did identify several groups of forest 629 
owners likely to capitalize on the benefits provided by payments for ecosystem services 630 
programs, namely the ability to receive annual revenue capable of offsetting rising property taxes 631 
and the ability to maintain non-market values such as local aesthetics and recreation use values. 632 
If a payments for carbon sequestration program could be combined with payments for other 633 
ecosystem services such as water quality and wildlife habitat, it is possible these individuals 634 
would be even more likely to see these ‘alternative’ forest management programs as viable 635 
mechanisms from which they could benefit financially and maintain the strong personal 636 
meanings they hold towards their forestlands. Programs could become even more attractive if 637 
payments accounted for carbon already stored or the social cost of carbon. On a strategic level, 638 
payments for carbon sequestration programs offer the promise of preserving local ecological 639 
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structure and function while simultaneously enabling forest owners to benefit financially from 640 
the public goods they provide to society.641 
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Table 1 
Carbon sequestration program attributes and levels examined using stated choice methods in this, and previous, research 
Previous research 
Attribute and Levels 
Financial 
incentives (annual 
payment per acre 
(USD)) 
Contract 
length (yrs.) Program administration Geographic region of the United States 
> 5 
to < 
25 
≥ 25 
to < 
50 
≥ 
50 5 15 30 
State 
agency 
Federal 
agency 
Private 
company 
North 
Atlantic 
and New 
England 
Northern 
Midwest 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Fletcher, 
Kittredge, and 
Stevens 2009 
✓ ✓  ✓      
 ✓  
Dickinson et al. 
2012 
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓     
 ✓  
Markowski-
Lindsay et al. 
2011 
✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 ✓  
Knoot, 
Rickenbach, 
and Silbernagel 
2015 
✓ ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ 
  ✓ 
Miller et al. 2014 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓      ✓ 
Rabotyagov and 
Lin 2013 
   ✓  ✓    
  ✓ 
Miller, Snyder, 
and Kilgore 
2012 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    
  ✓ 
Kelly, Germain, 
and Stehman 
2015 
  ✓   ✓    
✓   
Finley and 
Kittredge 2006 
   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
   
Wade and 
Moseley 2011 
         
✓ ✓  
Note. Other program attributes investigated in the literature: The requirement of a management plan (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; 
Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain, 
and Stehman 2015; Wade and Moseley 2011; Miller et al. 2014; Finley and Kittredge 2006); an early withdrawal penalty (Fletcher, Kittredge, 
and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011); payment mode (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015); development 
and/or timber rights conveyed (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015); inspections (Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015); enrolled acreage 
(Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013). 
 5 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of sampled forest owners and their properties 
    Range 
 Percent Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Characteristics of forest owner      
Age  64.2 11.2 47 91 
Education      
High school degree or equivalent 15.0     
Some college (no degree) 16.7     
College degree 40.0     
Some graduate school 6.7     
Graduate degree or higher 21.7     
Gender (female) 28.3     
Income      
Less than $24,999 13.3     
$25,000 - $49,999 10.0     
$50,000 - $99,999 40.0     
$100,000 or more 30.0     
Unsure/Don’t know 6.7     
Presence  15.3 14.9 0.1 58.0 
Years of forest ownership  20.4 12.8 2.0 58.0 
Sense of placea  0.0 1.0 -2.3 1.4 
Characteristics of forest owners’ property      
Forest size  6.9 8.4 1.0 51.0 
Management plan present 31.7     
Timber harvested for income generation 18.3     
Economic value (thousands $US)b   397.8 394.3 34.3 2553.0 
Notes. a Factor score calculated from modified version of Jorgensen and Stedman’s (2006) 
psychometric scale 
 b Tax assessed value of entire parcel 
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Table 3 
Sampled forest owners’ sense of place towards their properties 
 Proportion of sampled forest owners 
Sense of place statement item 
Complete 
disagreement 
Moderate 
disagreement 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
Moderate 
agreement 
Complete 
agreement 
Everything about my wooded 
land is a reflection of me 
16.7 16.7 27.8 13.0 25.9 
I feel that I can really be 
myself when I am on my 
wooded land 
8.9 1.8 28.6 1.9 13.5 
My wooded land reflects the 
type of person I am 
11.1 14.8 24.1 27.8 22.2 
I feel relaxed when I’m on my 
wooded land 
3.5 7.0 12.3 28.1 49.1 
I feel happiest when I’m on 
my wooded land 
7.1 8.9 21.4 26.8 35.7 
My wooded land is my 
favorite place to be 
8.9 10.7 28.6 19.6 32.1 
I really miss my wooded land 
when I’m way from it for 
too long 
16.0 10.0 32.0 20.0 22.0 
My wooded land is the best 
place for doing the things 
that I enjoy most 
9.3 18.5 33.3 16.7 22.2 
For doing the things that I 
enjoy most, no other place 
can compare to my wooded 
land 
16.7 25.9 29.6 14.8 13.0 
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Table 4 
Results of multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression 
Independent variable 
(fixed-effects) Coef. S.E. Odds Ratio S.E. p > |z| 
Program attributes 
Contract lengtha      
15-year contract -2.266 0.405 0.104 0.042 *** 
30-year contract -4.855 0.947 0.008 0.007 *** 
Annual paymentb      
$25 per acre annual 
payment 2.917 0.623 18.492 11.521 *** 
$50 per acre annual 
payment 4.702 0.780 110.131 85.884 *** 
Program 
administrationc      
Administered by a 
state agency 0.451 0.405 1.569 0.636  
Administered by a 
federal agency 0.613 0.581 1.847 1.073  
Characteristics of forest owner 
Age -0.059 0.037 0.943 0.035  
Education 0.597 0.297 1.816 0.539 ** 
Gender 1.136 0.773 3.115 2.407  
Income -0.286 0.164 0.751 0.123 * 
Presence -0.005 0.028 0.995 0.028  
Sense of place -0.086 0.380 0.918 0.349  
Characteristics of forest owners’ property 
Size of forest stand -0.030 0.020 0.971 0.020  
Management plan 
present -1.122 0.803 0.326 0.261  
Timber harvested for 
income generation 1.411 0.898 4.100 3.681  
Economic value 8.97e-07 9.08e-07 1.000 9.08e-07  
      
Constant -1.995 2.964 0.136 0.403  
      
Random-effects 
Parameters 
     
Respondent 
(constant) 4.377 1.63    
Notes. n = 60 (540 discrete choices); Wald 2 (16) = 68.24; p > 2 < 0.001; *** p < 0.01; ** p 
< 0.05; * p < 0.10 
a 5-year contract is the base category 
b $5 per acre annual payment is the base category 
c Administration by a federal agency is the base category 
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Table 5. Revenue generated from payments for carbon sequestration programs relative to 
timber harvest and development. 
Annual 
payment 
per acre 
Contract 
length 
(years) 
Average 
discounted 
annual 
revenuea 
Average 
discounted 
contract length 
revenuea 
Years of 
enrollment to 
match timber 
valueb 
Years of 
enrollment to 
match land 
valuec 
$5 5 $47 $190 493 8376 
$5 15 $30 $426 769 13072 
$25 5 $353 $1,411 66 1128 
$25 15 $261 $3,648 90 1527 
$25 30 $96 $2,774 245 4159 
$50 5 $654 $2,617 36 608 
$50 15 $610 $8,540 38 652 
Notes. Programs with the highest level of financial incentives ($50 per acre per year) were not 
combined with the longest contract length (30 years) in the fractional factorial design.  
a Annual discount rate of 4.0% applied (Folmer, Gabel, and Opschoor 1995). 
b Mean total timber value was $23,398 (SD = $27,076). Timber value estimates derived from 
on-site assessments of: number and type of tree species present; average tree age; maximum 
diameter at breast height; and total forested area. Values were calculated only for forest 
owners’ properties where on-site assessments were conducted (n = 41). This value does not 
include any interest the forest owner would accrue from the timber harvest. 
c Mean total land value was $397,821 (SD = $394,287). 
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Figure 1. Study area (the counties included in the study are labeled A-E in the map inset; NLCD 
refers to the USDA Forest Service’s National Land Cover Dataset).  
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Figure 2. Discrete choice survey question.  
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